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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Italics ours)
At the close of all the evidence in this case the court
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, it having
been urged in support thereof that the evidence as a matter
of law disclosed the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
and failed as a matter of law to make a jury question on
the negligence of the defendant (Tr. 98, 99).
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Surely it is unnecessary to brief for this court the i.d::
law governing the trial court's exercise of its power to;.;.;.;.;.;.
direct a verdict. We take no issue with appellant thereon.;:::::
We also believe that the law establishing the duty and::::::
limiting the duty of a delivering carrier to a consignee ;
with respect to the condition of a railroad car and its
lading is well settled and subject to little if any dispute. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
The question of whether the trial court erred or not in;;;;;;:
directing a verdict in this case obviously requires the test- 1i i
ing of the facts disclosed by the record against the simple , , , , _.
principles of law referred to. As it appears to us that this ..
court must dispose of the appeal in such fashion, a detailed, ..... .
accurate and com.plete statement of the facts is essential ..... .
if the briefs are to be helpful. We consider the statement
of facts in appellant's brief wholly inadequate to assist
the court and respectfully submit the following exposition
thereof, with supporting references to the record. At the
outs.et a statement of the controlling legal principles seems
appropriate.
First, in a case of this kind, if the plaintiff was himself guilty of negligence pro~imately contributing to the
accident causing his injuries, it is a complete bar to recovery. If the evidence of plaintiff's own negligence is
such that the minds of reasonable men could not differ
thereon, the trial court should direct a verdict in favor of
the defendant. It should be noted that this is not a case
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the plaintiff
was not an employe of the defendant.
Second, the defendant as a delivering carrier owes a
duty to a consignee and to a consignee's employes to make
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a reasonable inspection of the car to be delivered, and its ·
lading, and to discover any defects in the car or the lading
which are discoverable upon a reasonable inspection and
which might cause injury to one in the process of unloading the car wh·ile s·u.ch person was exercising due care for
his own safety. The duty of a delivering carrier upon discovery of such a defect as might cause injury to one exercising due care for his own safety during the process of
unloading, is to repair the defect or give notice to the consignee. Either to repair or give notice. The delivering
carrier's duty is discharged by repairing or giving notice
after they have discovered the defect. (Authorities hereinafter cited.)
The plaintiff, 33 years of age, was employed by the
construction firm of Rademann-Guisto Co. of Oakland, CaJifornia, which firm had a contract with the ·Pacific Fruit
Express Company for the erection of a plant at Pocatello,
Idaho (Tr. 1, 2, 3). The defendant .railroad delivered a
flatcar to the plaintiff's employer loaded with two large
steel tanks, and plaintiff was injured while assisting in
the unloading thereof. The accident occurred December
7, 1949, and plaintiff brought suit against the defendant
Union Pacific Railroad Company August 28, 1951, some
twenty months later.
The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the· defendant was negligent in that (a) defendant failed to inspect the car and lading before delivery; (b) defendant
negligently inspected the car and lading and failed to discover the broken tie band on the tank; (c) defendant negligently spotted the car for unloading when it knew, or
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should have known, that the car was in an unsafe condi•
•
UUUUUIU
t1on for unloading (Tr. 2, 3). The defendant In answer
.
::::q·r:mil
denied the foregoing and pleaded affirmatively, assumption ,,,,,
i; i i
of risk and negligence of the plaintiff himself proximately-······················
contributing to cause his injuries (Tr. 6, 7, 8). A'ssumption ,,, .......
of risk was not argued by the defendant as a basis for its
motion for a directed verdict.

)j

~· ~· J' J' J' J' J' J'l

I

ll\l\11•:·:·:·:·;;

The car in question had been loaded on the Southern ,,,,, ........
Pacific Company lines at Oakland, California, and routed ,
Southern Pacific to Ogden, Utah, Union Pacific to Poca- .......... ..
tello, Idaho. It was a flatcar loaded with two steel tanks
of equal size, approximately 10 feet in diameter, 20 feet
in length, occupying practically the entire flatcar when
laid lengthwise, end to end. (Defendant's Exhibits 3, 4,
and Tr. 4). These tanks fit snugly in wooden cradles and
were held in place by steel bands approximately 21/2 to 3112
inches in width and 1/16 to 3/32 of an inch in thickness.
The bands used on the car were 1f2 to 1 inch wider than the
sample in evidence (Tr. 35, 59, and Defendant's Exhibit 5).
These tie bands, as they are referred to, passed over the
top .of the tanks and through the stake pockets in the bed
of the flatcar, the ends being then laid back against the
strap and fastened with clamps by a machine·. Each tank
was held by two of such bands which were located 3 or 4
feet from the end of each tank (Tr. 4, 6, 7, 23). All of the
witnesses on both sides testified that this was the customary way for loading and securing such tanks for shipment
by rail. When the car arrived at Pocatello it was subjected
to the regular inspection given all cars at that point whether
they are to be delivered to a consignee in the City of Poca-
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tello or are to continue on to some other destination. The
car, as will be seen from defendant's Exhibits 3 and 4the same being freight waybills-was Southern 51595. When
inspected by the defendant railroad upon arrival the broken
tie band was discovered and noted by defendant's witness
George_ S. Cutler, who was the lead car inspector at Pocatello at that time, and a record thereof made (Defendant's
Exhibit 1). This record is the American Association of
Railroads original record of inspection required by all member railroads to be preserved. The record is made only on
those cars on which defects are noted (Tr. 72, 86). At the
time of the inspection a placard or bad order card, similar
to defendant's Exhibit 2, was stapled with an automatic
stapling hammer on the side of the bed of the flatcar and
the specific defect "broken tie band" was indicated thereon
(Tr. 72, 73). No other placard or notice is placed on or
sent along with the car upon delivery (Tr. 79, 80). The
witness George S. Cutler testified- that it was, and ,had
been for the 27 years he had worked as a car inspector for
the defendant company in its yards at Pocatello, the custom
and practice to card cars in such manner and if the car
and its load was safe for transportation, to deliver the same
to the local consignee, so carded ( Tr. 73, 74 . Of course,
if the car was not consigned to a local consignee it would
go to the rip track for repairs before· it went out on the
main line again. If it was not safe for transportation to a
local consignee, it would be made safe before delivery. The
defendant's witness Alfred W. Peters, General Car Foreman at Pocatello with 32 years experience in the car department, corroborated the witness Cutler in the foregoing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
(Tr. 86, 87, 89, 90). As to the custom and practice of
placing a bad order tag on a car safe for transportation
but having some other defect and then delivering it to a
local consignee, the witness Peters testified that it was the
same at Ogden, Utah, and Cheyenne, Wyoming, where he
had also worked for defendant as a car inspector. The car
inspected was delivered to the construction area where the
plaintiff was working shortly after the inspection and
spotted on an industry track running north and south.

I

The plaintiff was working with a gang of five experienced steel workers, including the foreman, Don Evans,
who testified on behalf of the plaintiff. All of the gang
were experienced steel men (Tr. 38), the foreman having
had 12 years experience in steel ( Tr. 44) , and the plaintiff
himself having had approximately 12 years experience as
a steel worker ( Tr. 2) . They started preparing to unload
the tanks at approximately 12:30 P. M. December 7, 1949,
and these five men, including the plaintiff Stickle, worked
about the car preparing cribbing and moving up a crane
wit~ which to lift the tanks off· the car and performing
other preliminary tasks for somewhere between thirty minutes and one hour before the plaintiff Stickle was injured
(Tr. 34, 35). During the preparation for unloading the
tank the plaintiff himself cut the south tie band on the
southerly of the two tanks on the car. The car was standing
on a track running north and south and this band was cut
on the east side (Tr. 7). The crane which was to be used
in lifting the tank off the car was to be moved up on the
west side of the car and plaintiff testified that someone
had to go on top of the tank to hook the crane (plaintiff's
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testimony Tr. 7). He then testified, "So I grabbed ahold
of the metal band and proceeded to crawl up. I got just
about on top when it broke on the other side" (Tr. 7).
Pressed by his counsel as to whether or not he did any
"testing" to see whether or not the strap would hold him
before he went up, he testified: "I just put my weight on
it to see if it would hold is all." He also testified that
while it is a common practice to cut a tie band and use
it much as one would a rope to pull himself up on top of
the car (Tr. 7), it was also customary for the man who
was going on top of the tank to go up the boom of the crane
and thus reach the place on top of the tank where he would
fasten the chains or cables to be used in unloading (Tr.
26). His foreman, Don Evans, testified that the work was
not always done by a man pulling himself up by the tie
band, as now contended for by appellant, but was also performed by a man riding the crane up.
Questions by Mr. Roberts:
· "Q. Now is there a custom and practice with
relation to the manner in which these cars are unloaded that have the things on them that this car
did?
"A. Oh, generally, yes.
"Q. And what is that custom and practice?
"A. Well, you cut your car loose and get your
crane in there to hook on to it and take it off.
"Q. Well, what is it with relation to going up
the side of the tank?
"A. Well, the way, the general practice is either
that, climbing up the side, or riding the crane up.
"Q. One or the other is the way it is done?
"A. Yes" (Tr. 45).
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A crane was being moved up to the car at the time
plaintiff fell, and the tanks were finally removed by use
of the crane ( Tr. 4, 39, 40).
The plaintiff testified that in his experience the tanks
in question were loaded in the customary manner (Tr. 21) ;
that he had worked all over the United States as a steel
worker, and had assisted in· unloading approximately 50
to 75 similar loads and had personally gone on top of such
loads 20 to 30 times (Tr. 5, 30) .
The tie band which broke and permitted the plaintiff
to fall was, by the testimony of the plaintiff and his witness the foreman, Don Evans, fractured in such a fashion
that before the plaintiff endeavored to pull himself up
thereby less than 1;4 of an inch of metal was holding the
strap together on the west side of the car. It broke near
the point where it entered the stake pocket on the west
side of the car. Both the plaintiff and his foreman testified
that it was an old break and that after the plaintiff had
fallen they examined the fracture and found the break
to be weathered and rusty, with the exception of a break
of less than 1;4 of an inch in length on one edge of the
strap which showed bright ·metal (Tr. 29, 31, 32, 46).
Neither the plaintiff nor his foreman made any examination or inspection whatsoever of the car or its. lading or
the tie band to determine whether the clamps on the west
side had loosened, whether the band .was broken or had
become detached from the west side of the car, or in any
other way had become unsuitable for the use to which the
plaintiff Stickle knew he was going to put it when he cut
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it on the east side of the car with the intention of using
it to climb with. The break in the tie band was such that
it was readily observable. The plaintiff Stickle told his
counsel Mr. Roberts on direct examination that if he had
gone over on the west side of the car and examined the
tie band he could have seen that it was broken (Tr. 8).
On cross-examination he again admitted that the break
could have been readily observed had he or anyone on the
gang looked (Tr. 35). The foreman Evans also testified
on cross-examination as to the nature of the break as
follows:
Questions by Mr. Bronson :
"Q. And you didn't inspect it, is that right?
"A. N o.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

And none of your men inspected it?
N 0.
And Mr. Sickle didn't inspect it?
No, I don't think ~o.

And yet the break in that band was such,
you have told us, that it was readily ohserved if
somebody had been inspecting those bands ?
"A. Yeah, if you had been inspecting them.
"Q.

You could have readily observed that, is
that right?
"A. I think so" (Tr. 62).
Called on rebuttal by the plaintiff he was asked on crossexamination:
"Q.

"Q.

You didn't make any inspection of the ·car,

did you?
"A. No particular inspection" (Tr. 96).
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The plaintiff Stickle was also called on rebuttal and again
testified, as he had on direct, as follows:
"Q. And even without a bad order card tacked
on the car had you been inspecting the car, observ.ing this band that you were going to use to pull yourself up with, you could have seen that it was broken,
is that right?
"A. Yes sir, that's. right" ( Tr. 98) .
Both the plaintiff Stickle and- his witness the Foreman
Evans testified that in their work they were familiar with
bad order cards being placed upon railroad cars which they
had in the past unloaded. 'rhey both testified that they
would not proceed to unload a car which was placarded as
bad ordered for some defect until they had made a check
of the car and ascertained whether or not it was safe to
do so ( Tr. 96, 97) . Yet they did not examine the car for
a bad order card or anything else. They both testified that
they did not notice a bad order card- on the car in question,
but it was obvious that they did not look, and they both
admitted on cross-examination that they made no examination or inspection of the car. The plaintiff Stickle himself testified on cross-examination as follows:
Mr. Bronson:
"Q. You have seen those (referring to had order cards) sticking on cars, haven't you? You didn't
observe anything like that on this car?
"A. No, I didn't.
"Q. Of course you didn't make any inspection
of the car?
"A. None whatsoever'' (Tr. 39).
This, in spite of the fact that by the testimony of the plaintiff himself, he and his foreman and the rest of the gang
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had been around and about the car for from 30 minutes to

one hour prior to the time he was injured preparing it for
unloading.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT
TO A JURY TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF T'HE
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE AUT'HORITIES.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT III.
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
INTRODUCED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
NEGLIGENT IN THAT IT FAILED TO REPAIR OR TO GIVE WARNING OF THE BROKEN TIE BAND TO PERSONS WHO WOULD
UNLOAD THE TANKS FROM THE FLATCAR.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. ·
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT
TO A JURY TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICAB.LE AUTHORITIES.
In connection with this point appellant urges upon
this court the proposition that the question of contributory
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negligence is for. the jury where the evidence and the inferences to be deduced therefrom are such that reasonable
men might arrive at different conclusions, citing four or
five authorities from this court in support thereof. We are
at a loss. to understand why such an elementary and fundamental proposition of law should be briefed for this court.
This case is not one under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act and the conception of negligence as laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States under such act should
not be extended to all other cases in the law, particularly
where as here it is not a suit by an ·employe against his
employer. Not only in this connection but in connection
with appellant's brief as a whole it might be well to refer
to the statement of Mr. Justice Wolfe in the case of Eugene
W. Raymond v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,' 113 Utah
26, 191 P. 2d 137, which involved the same defendant and
the same counsel. It was another suit by an employe· of
a consignee, who, in total disregard of every reasonable,
sensible measure .for his own safety, was injured on a car
which this defendant had delivered to his employer. After
·receiving full compensation under the appropriate act he
brought suit against this defendant and was nonsuited because of his contributory negligence, which judgment was
affirmed. This court with respect to "Point I" said:
"It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff
that this decision has deprived him, of his constitu. .
tional right to a jury trial. That contention has been
urged upon this court in almost ·every case of nonsuit and directed verdict brought before us. This
court is charged with the duty of protecting all of
the rights of all litigants. This is especially true of
those fundamental rights guaranteed by the State
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and Federal Constitutions. But the right to have a
jury pass upon issues of fact does not include the
right to have a cause submitted to a jury in the hope
of a verdict where the facts undisputably show that
the plaintiff is not entitled to relief."

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ERR IN HOLD,
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTO-RY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
After defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
made and the court had listened to arguments thereon, the
trial judge took the matter unde·r advisement until the
following morning. When the jury returned the following
morning the judge, having determined that he should direct a verdict, spent some 10 or 15 minutes speaking somewhat informally to the jury in connection with his. dismissing them from further. service in the case (Tr. 101103). In following this highly comm-endable practice, which
is no more than a display of good manners and judicial
courtesy on the part of the trial judge toward the jury,
it is doubtful that the trial court considered he was delivering a technical oral legal opinion which would be subjected to what we consider the rather captious criticism
now made by appellant's counsel. The trial judge did. make
the unfortunate statement attributed to him by appellant's
counsel on page 11 ·of his brief, which statement of the law
is unquestionably erroneous. Appellant's counsel says that
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the trial judge, "Took the utterly defenseless position that
the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to free himself
from contributory negligence", and "Apparently * * *
had the idea that it was incumbent upon plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not
guilty of contributory negligence." Appellant's counsel on
numerous occasions in the past, when we were also present
as counsel for the defendant, has heard the Honorable Ray
Van Cott, Jr. instruct the jury that the defendant has the
burden of proving contributory negligence of the plaintiff,
and must prove it to the satisfaction of the jury by a
preponderance of the evidence. Charging the trial court
in this instance with ignorance of such an elementary and
basic principle in the trial of personal injury suits seems
particularly unwarranted in view of the fact that Judge
Van Cott, prior to the time he made the unfortunate statement referred to and early in his talk to the jury, said:
"The doctrine and well-settled law is that if a person is
himself guilty of negligence which contributes to his own
injury, that fact is fatal to his righ~ to recover against
somebody else, and it is on that basis that I have determined
as a matter of law and without any question of fact that
the plaintiff ought not to be permitted to recover against
the railroad in this instance" (Tr. 101, 102). "The evidence
in this case ·shows; by the plaintiff himself, that had he
walked around and looked at this strap that he was about
to use as a ladder to climb up this side of this tank that
he would have seen that the strap was torn and that it
probably was not safe" (Tr. 101). The court did not purport· to discuss "burden of proof", "preponderance of the
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evidence", or the rules of law governing the direction of a
verdict in any technical sense. Only desperation over a
cause without merit can account for counsel grasping at
this straw.
This court must examine the facts in the record and
from the record alone determine whether or not there is
any substantial conflict in the evidence on contributory negligence which would warrant submitting the case to the
jury and whether or not there is any substantial evidence
of the defendant's negligence which would warrant submitting the case to the jury. There may be situations where
the court itself is deciding a question of fact and where the
record discloses that because of a misconception of the law
the court reached such a dubious result as· warrants reversal. An example might be where the court found a
defendant guilty of a criminal offense by a misapplication
of law to an undisputed set of facts. But that is not this
case, and even though it be ridiculously assumed that Judge
Van Cott did not understand the law, it does not change
the facts in this record upon which the case must be affirmed or reversed.
Turning now to the facts in the record bearing upon
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, there is but one
suggestion made for submitting the case to the jury, viz:
that the plaintiff put his weight on the tie band as he
started to climb the same and thus "tested it". The appellant does not mention one single piece of evid~nce in the
entire record which would indicate that the plaintiff exercised any care for his own safety, for the simple reason
that there is no evidence in the record that he did so. On
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the contrary, both he and his foreman admitted in their
testimony that they did nothing whatsoever to ascertain
whether or not it wfos safe to use the tie band in the manner it was used. The entire testimony which counsel says
raises an· issue of fact that warrants submitting this case
to the jury because plaintiff "tested" the strap, appears on
page 7 of the transcript and is· as follows:
Questions by Mr. Roberts:
"Q. All right. Now after you cut through the
band with this torch then what did you do, please?
"A. Then the crane was moving over there
from the other side ; we was going to spot the crane
on the other side, so someone had to go up on top
to hook the crane. So I g'rabbed ahold of the metal
band and proceeded to crawl up. I got just about
on top when it broke on the other side.
"Q. Now is there anything you did in connection with testing this strap before you went up?
"A. I just put my weight on it to see if it
would hold is all.
"Q.

And did it?

"A.

It held me, yes" (Tr. 7).

If the plaintiff had done anything other than, as he said,
"grabbed ahold of the metal band and proceeded to crawl
up", it seems to us he would have said so without prompting
by counsel. Even when prompted by his counsel with the
leading suggestion that he "tested" the strap, he would
only say, "I just put my weight on it to see if it would
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hold is all." Of course the plaintiff could not start climbing the strap without putting his weight thereon before
his feet were off the bed of the flatcar. It is all too obvious
that he simply took hold of the metal band and proceeded
to crawl up. His foreman on direct examination, questioned by his counsel Mr. Roberts, testified as follows:
"Q.

And did Mr. Stickle start to go up?

"A.

y es.

"Q.

Where were you at the time he did?

"A. I was standing on the ground, right at the
side of the car.
And will you tell us what you saw? Just
describe what he did and what happened.
"Q.

Well, he come on the car and grabbed
ahold of the strap and started climbing up. He got
"A.

nearly to the top and it give way and he fell" (Tr.
46).
Counsel reiterates again and again in argument that
the plaintiff "tested" the strap before climbing and that
this made a question for the jury as to whether or not the
plaintiff was exercising due care for his own safety. If
the plaintiff had had the slightest interest in whether or
not the strap was sufficient to support his weight all he
would have had to do was to look at it, as the tear in the
strap was readily apparent as testified to by both the plaintiff and his foreman Evans ( Tr. 8, 35, 62, 96, 98). The
only statement in .the record suggesting that the plaintiff
"tested" the strap came from his counsel. The plaintiff
by his own testimony made no examination whatsoever,
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nor was any ,examination made by plaintiff's foreman, of :
the condition of the car or of the load. On direct examina- ,
tion the plaintiff testified ;
Did you see this band from the other side
of the car, where it had broken?
"Q.

"A. Yes. They· went over and got it because
they wanted to know what was, why it broke and
they went over and examined it afterwards.
"Q. When you say, 'they went over' what do
you mean?

. "A. They went over and picked it up right
-where it was laying. I drug it right down to the
ground with me.
"Q.

You drug it down on your side?

"A.

Yes.

And this particular metal band would be
which one; the one that broke?
"Q.

"A.

The one on the south end of the tank.

Would you describe for us, please, the
condition of this band as you observed it there?
"Q.

"A. Yes. It was, it had evidently had quite a
jar some place during the trip and it had broke almost in two. There was a fresh tear of less than ·a
quarter of an inch left and the rest had all rusted
over, so it had been broken for some time.
"Q. And as you looked at it there could you
observe that condition; as you saw it?

"A. If you had've went over there and examined it you could have, yes" (Tr. 8).
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On cross-examination the plaintiff testified:
Questions by Mr. Bronson:
Of course you didn't make any inspection
of the car?
"Q.

''A.

None whatsoever" (Tr. 39).

And further :

And even without a bad order card tacked
on the car had you been inspecting the car, observing this band that you were going to use to pull
yourself up with, you could have seen that it was
broken, is that right?
"Q.

"A. Yes sir, that's right" (Tr. 98).
Plaintiff's foreman Evans testified on cross-examination,
referring to the car :
"Q.

And you didn't inspect it, is that right?

"A.

N o.

"Q.

And none of your men inspected it?

"A.

No.

"Q.

And Mr. Stickle didn't inspect it?

"A.

No, I don't think so.

And yet the break in that band was such,
you have told us, that it was readily observed if
somebody had been inspecting those bands?
"Q.

"A.

Yeah, if you had been inspecting them.

You could have readily observed that, is
that right?
"Q.

"A.

I think so" (Tr. 62).
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The plaintiff and his foreman were both experienced · · · ·
steel men, the plaintiff having worked all over the United :::::
States in steel for approximately 12 years. He had assisted
in the unloading of 50 to 75 similar tanks from flatcars
and had personally gone on top of such tanks 20 to 30 times
( Tr. 5, 30). The plaintiff and his foreman and the rest
of the gang, all experienced steel men, had spent between
thirty minutes and one hour about the car preparing it for
unloading prior to the time the plaintiff was injured (Tr. · · ·
34, 35) . The plaintiff himself used a torch to cut, on the
east side of the car, the tie band which he used to climb
on top of the tank with.
Appellant's counsel contends that because the plaintiff
and his foreman knew that railroads customarily inspect
cars before delivering them to a consignee, they had a
right to asume that the car was in reasonably safe condition· for unloading. Assuming this to be true, it does not
relieve plaintiff of all responsibility. The defendant was
not an insurer of plaintiff's safety. It cannot be contended
that because the railroad company inspects the car before
delivery the consignee or his employes are relieved of the
duty to exercise reasonable care for their own safety. The
undisputed evidence in this case is that the defendant company made an inspection of the car and its lading upon
arrival at Pocatello, discovered the broken tie band, and
gave notice thereof t6 the consignee. A record the~eof was
made at the time, which record is required to be preserved
by· the American Association of Railroads (Defendant's
Exhibit 1; Tr. 72, 86). Upon discovery of such a defect
and the making of a permanent record thereof, such as was
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done in this case, a bad order card (a sample thereof being
defendant's Exhibit 2) was stapled to the side of the bed
of the flatcar and written thereon was a reference to the
specific defect "broken tie band" (Tr. 72, 73). Defendant's
witness George S. Cutler, the inspector who found the defect and made the record thereof (Defendant's Exhibit 1),
said that in the light of the records he would say he did
place such a bad order card on the car (Tr. 72). That he
had no independent recollection of placing a bad order card
with the notation "broken tie band" upon the particular
car in question. Owing to the great lapse of time and the
many hundreds of cars he had inspected between the date
of the accident and the date of trial, he could not testify
otherwise. It is true that both the plaintiff Stickle and
his foreman Evans testified that they did not observe any
bad order card on the car, but in view of the fact that they
made no examination of the car, yet were familiar with
bad order cards and- recognized the importance of paying
heed to them when found on cars (Tr. 96, 97), such testimony does not even have the weight of negative evidence.
Assuming the car did not carry a bad order card, it would
not relieve plaintiff of exercising due care to avoid injury
on account of a clearly obvious defect in the load.
The appellant says at page 11 of his brief that, "Theirs
was ·not a duty to inspect. Precautions might be expected
from them as reasonably prudent persons in the performance of their job." The appellant thus admits that the
plaintiff was required to exercise reasonable care for his
own safety. This is all we have ever contended for or now
contend for on this appeal. The appellant apparently seeks
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to point out a distinction between the type of inspection
required to be made by the railroad company and the type
of inspection or examination which the consignee or his
employes has a duty to make. That such a distinction exists
in some types of cases may be admitted. In cases where a
defect is found to exist in the car itself rather than in the
load, the consignee, although he observes the defect or is
warned about it and is nevertheless injured, can under
some decided cases have the question of his contributory
negligence submitted to a jury. The question of his contributory negligence under such circumstances does not depend solely upon whether he was warned of the defect or
observed it himself, but in particular upon the question of
whether or not he fully appreciated the danger therefrom
on account of his lack of knowledge er experience with the
construction and functioning of various parts of railroad
cars that may be out of order. Many parts of railroad cars
themselves consist of mechanical contrivances, the functioning of which laymen are not entirely familiar with. For
instance, a dock laborer might observe a defect of some
kind in a power brake or a car door or be warned by the
railroad company about such defect and thereafter be injured because he did not fully appreciate the danger inherent in such defect. Under such circumstances, it is quite
proper to submit the question of contributory negligence
to a jury. In the case at bar it was not a defect in the car
that caused the injury, but a defect in the load-a defect
in the tie band holding the tanks on the car. This was a
condition that the plaintiff and his foreman should have
known a great deal more about than the railroad inspectors
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should be required to know in view of the plaintiff's experience as a steel worker and the large number of similar
loads he had assisted in unloading.
Every case that counsel for the appellant has cited to
this court in support of. the proposition that the plaintiff
had a right to reply upon the inspection made by the railroad company involves situations where there was a defect
in the car. In !.faker v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 278
F. 431, 434, cited by appellant, the plaintiff was injured by
the operaton of a defective door. He observed its general
ramshackle condition and certain defects in the door, but
the court held that in spite of this the question of his contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury for the
reason that there was still the question of whether or not
plaintiff as a layman and not a railroad car inspector' fully
appreciated the dangers that lay in the defects which he
observed. The court said :

.

"He was a merchant, not a car inspector. * * *
For him to have apprehended the danger it would
have been necessary for him mentally ·to have followed the application of force on the edge of the ·
door, to and through the boards held together only
at the top, to and through the hanger in its relation
to rail and canopy, and to have realized the likelihood or possibility of the hanger's being forced from
the rail as it came to the enlarged space between the
rail and canopy."
In other words, the danger from such a condition might be
readily observable to a railroad car inspector but not to a
layman and therefore reasonably raise a jury question -on
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. We submit
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this case is readily distinguishable from the one at bar
where the plaintiff himself was the specialist, the expert
skilled steel man, familiar with unloading similar tanks
from flatcars loaded in a similar manner. All the other
cases cited by counsel are of the same pattern and ~ikewise
not applicable to the facts in the case now before this court.
In the cited case of Folsom v. Lowden, 157 Kan. 328,
139 P. 2d 822, the plaintiff, a coal heaver, was unloading
coal from a gondola which had what is known in railroad
parlance as a "drop end". This means that the end of the
gondola is hinged and held in place by latches and may be
lowered to the bed of the gondola. In this case it was
warped and sprung. The plaintiff was unfamiliar with the
construction and operation of a drop end gondola. He was
unloading coal from the car and when he removed a chunk
of coal from the end of the car the end fell inward upon
him and injured his foot. It was quite properly held that
a jury question was presented on his own contributory
negligence.
In Paul v. Georgia Railway & Banking Co., 60 Ga. App.
461, 4 S. E. 2d 99, the railroad had delivered some cars
for unloading to the plaintiff's employer. As the cars were
unloaded they would be moved on the side track with a
pinch bar and another loaded car moved up to the place
where the plaintiff and his fellow workmen were unloading.
After one such car was unloaded and was in the process of
being moved on the track the adjacent car, containing a
load, rolled down upon the plaintiff injuring him. The
railroad company had not set the brake on the car which
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rolled free and the court held that a complaint setting up
the facts as thus outlined was not defective as showing
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a matter of
law.
In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Freppon, 134 Ky. 650, 121
S. W. 454, the plaintiff was injured when he attempted
to open a car door. He knocked out a pin that was holding
a defective car door and the court merely held that there
was a question as to whether or not he knew, or had reasonable grounds to believe, that the car door would fall
on him when he knocked the pin out.
The case of Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Ry. Co. v.
Riddle, 182 Okl. 318, 82 P. 2d 304, is another case cited by
appellant where the plaintiff was injured by a car door
that fell on him when he knocked off a cleat that was holding it in place. Here, as in all t.hese cases, there is a jury
question as to whether or not the individual plaintiff should
have, in the light of his experience and knowledge of the
functioning of various parts of railroad cars, appreciated
the danger even though he observed the defect.
The case of
338 Mo. 463, 92
was injured by
from the top of

Stoutimore v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,
S. W. 2d 658, was one where the plaintiff
a defective brake, being knocked thereby
a cattle car. The court said:

"Neither can we sustain defendant's contention
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. Plaintiff was not a railroad
man. He was working in the dark with the instrumentalities furnished to him by the defendant."
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The case of Lewis v. ·Southern Pac. Co., (Cal. App.),
220 P. 2d 431, also cited by appellant, involved a defect in
the door of the car. The plaintiff could clearly have observed the guides on the door, but nevertheless, he was not
held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
the court saying :
"Whether they should, acting as persons of ordinary care and prudence, have observed the defective guides and whether if they had they should with
their knowledge have realized the danger were properly questions for the jury."
An examination of the few cases cited by plaintiff that
we have not specifically referred to will show that they
are all cases involving defects to cars and injuries to plaintiffs who were warned, or who observed the defect but
were not sufficiently experienced to fully appreciate the
danger, and therefore, and only because of this latter qualfication, were they held to involve questions for the jury
on contributory negligence. They are readily distinguishable from the case at bar upon two grounds. First, the
defect here was not a defect in the car, but in the load ; and
second, it was the type of load that the plaintiff by his own
testimony was entirely familiar with. In view of his experience and the greater knowledge that he should have of
the danger inherent in such a defect as a broken tie band
than even a railroad car inspector, he is in no position to
assert that the cited cases apply to and should govern in the
case at bar.
Appellant urges that the defendant should be charged
with knowledge that it was the (!ustom in unloading such
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tanks for a man to cut a tie band and use it to pull himself
to the top of the tank and therefore a "special" duty ( although it is not suggested just what) is imposed upon defendant to warn the consignee if a broken tie band is found.
Of course plaintiff's own evidence was that such method
was not the customary method; that the work was also done
by a man "going up the crane" ( Tr. 45) .
At any rate, to place upon a delivering carrier the
duty of knowing all the methods that might be employed in
every case by consignees in unloading the myriad types of
shipments hauled by rail is ridiculous and fantastic. We
kriow of no authority that has ever suggested a delivering
carrier has such a duty and appellant cites none. We do
not· see how the argument is pertinent to the question of
contributory negligence in -any event.
This court in the recent case of Raymond v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 113 Utah 26, 191 P. 2d 137, held, in
accordance with all the ,authorities upon the matter, that
an employe of a consignee must exercise ordinary care for
his own safety working on and about cars which have been
delivered by a railroad. This rule applies even though the
railroad company itself was negligent in not inspecting or
failing to discover a d~fect in the ca·r or load that if should
have, or, having discovered the same, in failing to notify
the consignee by placarding the car with a bad order card.
In the Raymond case the plaintiff was an experienced
switchman who rode a gondola car loaded with scrap iron
into a coupling with a standing car and was injured as a
result of placing his hand inside the gondola. When the ·
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car came into impact with the standing car some of the
scrap fell on the plaintiff's hand. The plaintiff knew from
his experience as a switchman that it was a dangerous
thing for a man to put any part of his body inside a loaded
gondola while it was in motion. The trial court granted
a nonsuit on the grounds that the evidence showed the
plaintiff to have been guilty of negligence as a matter of
law. This court unanimously affirmed, and said :
"The obvious truth from plaintiff's own testimony is that he gave no thought to his own safety.
He placed his hand in a position which he knew to
be dangerous when there was a safe method open
to him. The court below correctly held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law."
The court in this decision attached considerable importance
to the fact that the plaintiff Raymond was an experienced
switchman. We submit that the plaintiff Stickle, an experienced steel man, experienced in unloading this very
type of shipment, obviously "gave no thought to his own
safety."
In a very early case decided by this court, Smith v.
Rio Grande Western Railway Co., et al., 27 Utah 307, 75
P. 749, it was held that the personal representatives of an
employe of a consignee were not entitled to recover for his
death occasioned by a defective brake on a car delivered
by the defendant where he had failed to exercise ordinary
care for his own safety. The defendant had delivered the
car with a defective brake, the defect being such that it
was readily observable upon the most casual inspection.
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Plaintiff's duty was to loosen the brakes on the car left
by the railroad company at a distance from the ore house,
allowing them to move downgrade, and stopping them by
means of the brake. He lost control of the cars, they ran
away, and he was killed. He had failed to follow the instructions of his employer as to the method of dropping
the cars and had given no attention to the condition of
the brake, which the court says was "obviously very defective." In holding the deceased guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, the court said:
"It is plainly indicated b.y the evidence that deceased made no effort to discover an open peril.
* * * The conclusion, from the evidence, is irresistable that the lamentable misfortune was the
result of his own heedlessness. * * * Such being the case the tortious acts or negligence of the
railroad company, if it was guilty of any, cannot
be made the basis of a recovery for injuries resulting from the wrong or negligence of the deceased."
In the case of Southern Pacific Co. vs. Edwards, 44
F. 2d 526, the plaintiff, an employe of a consignee, was .
preparing to unload some poles from a flatcar. The load
was retained in the customary manner by stakes set upright in the stake pockets along the side of the flatcar.
Wires were then fastened to the tops of the stakes and run
across the top of the load. The load in question was leaning
10 or 12 inches to one side. The plaintiff, following the
customary practice, cut the wires on the stakes but did so
while standing on the side of the car toward which the load
was leaning. As a result the poles fell upon him. The
court held that such conduct on his part constituted con-
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tributary negligence as a matter of law. In this case no
notice of the condition of the load had been given to the
plaintiff or his employer. The court said that under the
circumstances no notice was necessary and in holding plain-'
tiff guilty ·of contributory negligence as a matter of law
said:
"We are aware of no valid reason for holding
a carrier is under a duty to give notice or warning
of a condition which is so visible that any danger
therefrom must be apparent to and appreciated by a
person of ordinary intelligence, prudence and experience who undertakes the unloading .of a car."
In the case of North Dakota v. Great Northern Railway Co., 155 F. 2d 1005, the court affirmed a judgment
directing a verdict for the defendant upon the grounds that
the railroad was non-negligent and that plaintiff was himself guilty as a matter of law of contributory negligence.
While fu"ny recognizing the duty of the delivering carrier
the court had this to say about the duty of the plaintiff,
who was an employe of the consignee:
"The evidence was without dispute that the condition of the door was apparent to one who looked
at it. * * * Defendant was not an insurer of
the safety of plaintiff and had a right to assume
that this man of mature years and wide experience
would, while on defendant's property, exercise ordinary care for his own safety and it cannot be charged
with negligence for its failure to anticipate that
plaintiff· would not exercise such care. One is not
under the duty of anticipating negligence on the
part of others who have reached the age of maturity
and are in possession of all their physical and mental
faculties, but is entitled to assume and to act on
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the assumption that others will exercise ordinary
care for their own safety. Speaking of the duty to
exercise ordinary care, we said in St. Mary's Hospital v. Scanlon, 71 F. 2d 739: 'This duty is limited by the rule that no one is required to guard
against or take measures to avert that which a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances
would not anticipate as likely to happen.' "
While the above discussion by the court concerns the duty
of the defendant principally, it forcibly asserts the settled
principle of law that an employe of a consign~e must exercise ordinary care for his own safety in unloading a railroad car, and emphasizes that such duty exists apart from
and without any con-sideration of the negligence or nonnegligence of the delivering carrier.
Throughout appellant's brief it seems to us that there
has been an attempt to qualify and mi:dimize the duty that
plaintiff had to exercise ordinary care for his own safety,
by emphasizing and enlarging the duty the defendant as
a delivering carrier owed to the consignee and its employes.
Counsel for appellant at page 12 of the brief says the plaintiff had "no duty to inspect", and that he "had no required
duty to look." While admitting on page 15 of the brief
that the defect in the strap could be found by looking at
it, counsel for the appellant says that this "does not mean
that plaintiff was guilty of negligence because he did not
see it." He says- that it was the duty of the defendant railroad to see it, but not the duty of the plaintiff to see it.
Appellant throughout his brief seems to imply that because
he and his foreman knew that railroads inspected cars before delivery to consignees he was relieved of all duty of
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making any examination himself, that is, relieved of ·any
duty of exercising ordinary care for his own safety. Appellant's counsel says that plaintiff's task was to "use the
strap" and "not to inspect it." Such arguments seem to us
to be without any validity and certainly fail to relieve the
plaintiff of the duty he had to exercise reasonable care for
his own safety. No conduct on the part of the defendant
releases plaintiff from this responsibility. It simply comes
back to what was said by Mr. Justice Wolfe in the Raymond
case, supra:
"The right to have a jury pass upon issues of
fact does not include the right to have a cause submitted to a jury in the hope of a verdict where the
facts undisputably show that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief."
And quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the case of Johnson v. U. S., 68 S. Ct. 391, 394, this court went on to say:
"So long as liability is dependent upon proof
of fault on the part of the defendant, and freedom
from fault on the part of plaintiff, 'it is not for
this court to torture and twist the law of negligence
so as to make it in result a law not of liability for
fault, but a law of liability for injuries.' "
The trial court was amply warranted in directing a
verdict upon the grounds that the evidence in this case disclosed as a matter of law that the plaintiff was himself
guilty of negligence proximately contributing to his injuries.
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POINT III.
THERE W.A.S NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
INTRODUCED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
NEGLIGENT IN THAT IT FAILE.D TO REPAIR OR TO G~VE WARNING OF THE BROKEN TIE BAND TO PERSONS WHO WOULD
UNLOAD THE TANKS FROM THE F'LATCAR.
The duty of the defendant in part was to make a reasonable inspection to discover any defects in the car or
load that might cause harm to a person exercising ordinary
care for his own safety. (Raymond v. Union Pacific; Smith
v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co.; Southern Pac. Co. v. Edwards; North Dakota v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra).
The further duty of the delivering carrier we admit is to
repair such defect or to notify the consignee thereof. It is
important to recognize that the carrier may either repair
or notify the consignee of the defect if it chooses, and if
it does either it has discharged all the duty imposed by law.

Erie R. Co. v. Murphy, 108 F. 2d 817;
Sykes v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 178 Mo. 693,
77 s. w. 723;

Roy v. Georgia Ry. & Banking Co., (17 Ga. App.
34), 86 S. E. 328.
And see cases in the Annotation 126 A. L. R. 1095, where
the decisions specifically decide the point or assume it to
be the settled law in writing the decisions.
But the duty to notify exists only where the defect or
its potentialities for harm would not be evident to a less
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experienced person, which necessarily follows from the rule
that the delivering carrier has no duty to warn of a defect
that is readily apparent to an ordinary person exercising
due care for his own safety.
We earnestly say to this court that the defect in the
tie band-"readily observable" by plaintiff's own testimony
had he lpoked at it before he used it to pull himself UPwas such that had the defendant not discovered it or, discovering it, failed to give notice thereof, it would not as
a matter of law constitute negligence. The defendant's
duty is limited by the rule that it has a right to assume
others will exercise ordinary care for their own safety.
No delivering carrier is required to anticipate and guard
against and take measures to avert the consequences of a
failure on the part of the consignee or his employes to
exercise ordinary care for their own safety. The defendant
is not an insurer of its own employes, much less those of
its consignees. There is no duty to make loads "accident
proof." (Cases supra).
Be that. as it may, what did the defendant do towards
discharging its responsibility to the consignee in this case?
We ·think the defendant went beyond the requirements of
the law in the discharge of'its duty. It made the inspection,
it discovered the defect and it gave notice by bad ordering
the car. A greater display of care and responsibility would
scarcely be possible in view of the nature of the railroad
business. And the law requires· no more.
Appellant says at page 26 of his· brief that, "One of the
witnesses for the defendant company testified that bad or-
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dered cars should go to the repair track and a car with a
broken tie band, such as the car in question, should have
been sent to the rip track to be repaired." The witnesses
who testified on this point clearly testified to the contrary.
The general car foreman, Mr. Peters, testified that the
partciular car in question if safe for transportation would
in conformity with the custom be delivered to the consignee.
He was asked,
And would that kind of a load go to the
rip track or the repair track before it was being
moved?
"Q.

"A.

No sir" (Tr. 87).

Although he was subjected to a vigorous cross-examination
on the point he did not in the least deviate from his testimony that the particular ca:r: in question would i:ri view of
the type of defect involved be delivered to the consignee.
Counsel may be referring to the testimony of the witness
Cutler upon cross-examination. But this witness also on
direct testified as follows:
"Q. If you. find a defect in the load, such as a
broken tie band, and it appears to you that the car
can be moved without safety to the customer, is that
what you do with it?

"A.

Yes sir.

THE COURT:
don't you?

You mean with safety,

"Q.

I mean with safety.

"A.

Yes sir.
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And in the twenty-seven years that you
have worked there in Pocatello has that been ·the
custom?
"Q.

"A.

Yes sir" (Tr. 74).

And on redirect he testified as follows:
Now, Mr. Roberts in questioning you,
when he was questioning you, you said that ordinarily if a car is bad ordered it goes to the rip track
for repairs?
·
"Q.

"A.

Yes sir, that's right.

"Q. Now ·suppose that there is a defect in the
load which is considered safe to transport to someone right there in the city, as distinguished from
going out on the line to the next town. What do you
do with that car?

"A. Ordinarily they just let it go to the place
that it is going to be unloaded if it is safe to go that
far. A tie band,· that would be safe to travel to
where it is going to be unloaded.
And would you consider this, a flat car
loaded with two tanks with say, two tie bands on
each one, one of which was broken, with the tanks
sitting in wooden cradles, would be safe to move
those within the city, from the inspection point to
the customer?
"Q.

"A.

Yes sir. Yes sir, they would be safe.

Well then, you wouldn't send that kind of
a load to the rip track, would you?
"Q.

"A.

No sir" (Tr. 81, 82).

We are not forgetting that the appellant says there
was sufficient evidence of a failure to put a bad order card
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on the car as to warrant submitting to the jury the question of defendant's negligence. This presupposes the defect
to be one that required notice, a defect that could not be
discovered by the exercise of ordinary care, which we are
unwilling to admit. As to the evidence of failure to give
notice, the defendant produced the Association of American
Railroads original inspection records signed by the witness
Cutler, car inspector on the job when the car went through.
The specific defect "broken tie band" was noted thereon
(Tr. 73, 74). The witness Cutler, who for 27 years had
been performing his job adequately it can be presumed, said
that although he had no recollection of the car independent
of the record, he was willing to say that he did staple a
bad order card on the car which bore a notation of the
specific defect "broken tie band" (Tr. 72). We ask the
court to consider the handicap the witness was under when
asked if he had an independent recollection of placarding
the car. There is no evidence as to when the defendant
learned that plaintiff considered it responsible for the accident. Suit was not instituted until the lapse of more than
twenty months. Plaintiff was not an employe of defendant.
It isn't that we ask the court without any basis to assume
the defendant did not learn of the accident until such a
lapse of time that ~ur car inspector could not honestly remember placarding the particular car in question. The
defendant had no reason to have an investigation file of an
accident that it did not know concerned it, or to talk to the
car inspector at a time so close to the event that he might have an independent recollection thereof. Such facts are
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from all the evi-
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dence in the case. Against this, the appellant says the testimony of the plaintiff and his foreman that they "did not
see a bad order card" is sufficient to make a jury question
on the issues of whether the defendant gave notice by placarding the car. In spite of the fact that plaintiff and his
foreman testified they were familiar with the use of bad
order cards, would not work on a car carrying such a card
until they ascertained they could do so in safety (Tr. 96,
97) , they nevertheless by their own admissions made no
inspection or examination of the car whatever, to determine
whether it carried a bad order card or was safe to unload
in the manner they were going to unload it (Tr. 96, 97, 98).
As to inspection, the plaintiff Stickle himself said he made
"none whatsoever'' (Tr. 39). The record we believe is such
as warranted direction of a verdict of no cause of action
on the non-negligence of the defendant alone. The defect
was so apparent as not to require notice to one exercising
ordinary reasonable care for his own safety. But if it be
thought otherwise, the, statement by plaintiff that he did
not see what he did not look for, is not the kind of evidence that raises an issue of fact upon which the minds of
reasonable men might differ.
It may be thought that placing a bad order card on a
car and noting the specific defect thereon is insufficient
notice. The evidence discloses that the practice and custom
of defendant at Pocatello for 27 years had been to serve
notice of bad order cars only in such manner (Tr. 73, 74) .
That such custom and practice prevailed elsewhere on defendant's line of railroad (Tr. 86, 87, 89, 90). That the
custom and practice is a reasonable one, a practical and
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almost necessary one cannot be questioned. If a car is safe
for transportation to a local industry, the exigencies of the
business require that it be sent to the consignee with a bad
order card placed thereon notifying of the defect. The law
permits such handling in connection with the load without
imposing liability on the delivering carrier for injuries
sustained by the consignee or his employes. Otherwise, the
car would have to be diverted to the repair track and wait
its turn for repairs. In this case it would have meant
putting on a new tie band that would be cut with a torch
as soon as consignee got the load. Not only an unnecessary
tie-up of railroad equipment would result, but consignees
themselves would strenuously object to such delay to their
shipments. Delays such as this would cause untold unnecessary expense to business and industry. Railroads can be
held liable in damages for unnecessary delays. The law
should be useful and practical while protecting individual
rights, and in this instance wisely approves the custom and
practice of notifying consignees of defects in loads by bad
order tags. On the very last page of appellant's brief he
quotes from Erie R. Co. v. Murphy, (supra) as follows:

"* * * Though the evidence was conflicting
as to whether an inspector should have carded a car
as unsafe or defective under the circumstances here
presented, there was substantial evidence * * * ."
indicating an assumption that placing a bad order card on
a car is sufficient form. of notice.
In North Dakota v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 155 F. 2d
1005, the plaintiff, a grain inspec~or employed by a company other than the defendant railroad, went to the repair
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track to inspect the grain in a car that had been bad ordered. He was given a list of all cars that had been sent
to the repair track and knew the car in question had been
bad ordered. The defendant railroad had put a bad order
card on the door and had written thereon "door out at top".
'The defect was readily observable and the danger inherent
in the defect was apparent. A fellow-employe removed the
seal and the· door fell on the plaintiff. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals said :

"* * * the evidence was without dispute
that the condition of the door was apparent to one
who looked at it. With warning that the car was
in bad order, and invitee was put on his guard, and
the bad order card showed that the car was in bad
order."
The court held there was no substantial proof of negligence
on the part of the defendant railroad and affirmed a directed verdict.
· Appellant seems to suggest that even though it be assumed the car in question was bad ordered there was a jury
question as to whether defendant ought to have done more.
He cites no authority for such a proposition, and we have
found none, recognizing such an extension of a carrier's
responsibility. The cases cited above indicate otherwise.
In view of. the plaintiff's special knowledge and experience
with the type ·of load in question, there is nothing whatever to suggest the defendant had a duty to do more than
follow the customary practice of placing a bad order card
on the car. Without specifically deciding the question of
what constitutes notice the cases, as do those cited above,
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all show an assumption by the courts that the duty to notify
is com plied "rith by placing a bad order tag on the car.
There were no special circumstances in the case at bar requiring more. The defendant is not charged with the burden of knowing the precise details of the method a consignee may choose to use in unloading. There is no proof
that defendant knew or ought to· have known a man would
use the tie band to pull himself to the top of the car. Plaintiff's own evidence was that just as frequently th~ man
went up the crane. A ladder or other means might just
as well, and perhaps with greater safety, be employed. The
defect was not such that any person would have observed
it and failed to appreciate the danger in putting it to the
use plaintiff did. And plaintiff was specially skilled and
experienced in unloading such tanks. We submit that a bad
order card was sufficient notice, if indeed notice was required at all.
In passing, it might be noticed that the plaintiff never
charged in the complaint (Tr. 2, 3), that the defendant
failed to give notice or proper notice and has never amended. ·
so as to make an issue thereof.
We think the evidence of the defendant's negligence is
insufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury.
First, for the reason that the defendant does not have a
duty to repair or give notice of a defect in a load where
the defect and its potentialities for causing harm are readily apparent to anyone undertaking to unload the car and
exercising care for his own safety. The admission of the
plaintiff and the undisputed evidence is that the defect was
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readily apparent to anyone that looked, and not only to one
skilled and experienced with this very type of load. Secondly, the statement by plaintiff that he did not see what
he did not look for-the bad order card-is insufficient in
view of defendant's inspection, discovery, record of defect,
universal practice of bad ordering such cars, great lapse of
time precluding an independent recollection of this particular car, to raise an issue upon which the minds of reasonable men might differ.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the evidence in this case
as a matter of law disclosed the negligence'--Of the plaintiff
to be a proximate cause, if not the sole cause, of the accident and his injuries, and failed as a matter of law to raise
any question substantial enough to warrant submission of
the defendant's negligence to a jury. Unless the defendant is an insurer, unless the law is "a law of liability for
injuries" and nothing more, we think the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
I

Respectfully submitted,

BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
MARVIN J. BERT'OCH,
Counsel for Defendant
and Respondent.
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Salt Lake City, Ut~h
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